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2Overview
9Ideal market discipline in principle
9Ideal market discipline vs. supervision
9Concerns about market discipline in 
practice
9The Pillar 3 Basel remedy
9Taking market discipline seriously
3Channels of Market Discipline…
9Direct
–Prices of debt and equity instruments
–Quantity rationing
9Indirect
–Financial press
–Securities analysts
–Ratings agencies
–Supervisory authorities
4Conditions for Effective
Market Discipline
1. Transparency of risk and capital 
positions
2. Adequate incentives to process 
information
3. Flexible, unbiased price and quantity 
adjustments that reflect probability of 
default
4. Bank responds to market signals by 
appropriate reductions in exposure or 
increases in capital
5The Central Role of the Board & 
Corporate Governance
9The Board should ensure that the bank has
– the financial and human resources and
– the management information systems that are 
appropriate for the risks they are taking
• Ensure the right people have the right information at 
the right time to make the right decision.
9The Board should
– Specify explicitly bank’s tolerance for risk
– Oversee the measurement of risk
– Supervise the management of risk
6Supervision vs. Ideal Market Discipline
Supervisory Discipline
9Episodic
9Backward looking
9Bureaucratic
9 Slow to Change
9Rule-based sanctions, 
imperfectly risk based
9 Substantial 
compliance costs
Ideal Market Discipline
9Continuous
9 Forward looking
9 Impersonal
9 Flexible and adaptive
9Variable, risk-
sensitive sanctions
9Lighter compliance 
costs
7The Key Difference:
The Burden of Proof
Market Self-Discipline
9Boards need to show 
they are not taking 
excessive risks
– Encourages stronger 
corporate governance
– Promotes disclosure
– Reduces supervisors’ 
liabilities
Supervision
9 Supervisors need to 
show an institution is 
taking excessive risks
– Subject to review
– Tendency to delay until 
damage occurs
– Undermines corporate 
governance
Burden of proof that the bank is prudently 
managed should fall on board & management
8But Supervision & Market 
Discipline Should Be Mutually 
Reenforcing
9Supervision & market discipline 
should be complementary…
9Market discipline can enhance the 
effectiveness of supervision
– By reducing burden on supervisors
– By guiding supervisory efforts
9Supervision should enhance the 
effectiveness of market discipline
– By promoting transparency
10
To this point, the case for market 
discipline seems overwhelming, but 
most of the world remains 
underwhelmed.  
9Why?
–What are the major concerns about 
market discipline in practice?
–How can they be addressed?
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Concern 1. Lack of Transparency
9 Theory and evidence
9 Data shared by management only with 
supervisors – not boards
9 Data deficiencies
– Largely backward looking and lagged
– Distorted by accounting conventions
9 Insufficient market demand for disclosure
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Concern 2. Inadequate incentives
9 Fear of loss, but dulled by safety net
9 Intensive supervision 
– Self-discipline is relaxed
9 Safety nets
– Explicit deposit insurance
– Implicit insurance
• Forbearance
• Lender of last resort assistance to banks of 
dubious solvency
• Guarantees & capital infusions
• Assisted Mergers
9 Fitch Ratings
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Concern 3.  Pricing Problems
9At best reflect only private, not social 
costs of insolvency
9Problems in extracting market 
information regarding probability of 
insolvency
9Sanctions ex post, after damage done
– Slow to reflect reductions in risk
9Cause destabilizing flows 
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Concern 4. Ineffectual Influence
9Safety net shields from market discipline
– Whenever risk premiums rise, bank shifts to insured 
sources or
– Blanket guarantees or
– State-owned banks
9Limited direct influence through new issues
9Indirect influence can compensate somewhat
– Tie supervisory sanctions to market indicators
• Allocation of supervisory resources
• Trigger full-scale Prompt Corrective Action
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Pillar 3 Addresses Only 1st Concern
9Departure from traditional 
reluctance to disclose
–Bureaucratic control of information
–Fears about instability
–Relatively meager voluntary supply
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1½ Cheers for Pillar 3
9More data, but quality and comparability 
concerns
– Accounting and provisioning practices
– Merely wistful on the topic of enforcement
– Opt out provisions
9Less transparency re:  Tier 1 ratios
9VaR disclosures a step back from IOSCO 
agreement
9Omits fx exposure and exposures to 
sovereigns and commercial real estate
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Guidelines for Disclosure Policy
1. Anticipatory, not reactive
2. Broad view of information 
relevant to valuing bank
• Mean
• Dispersion around the mean
3. Standardized definitions, formats 
and reporting intervals
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If Pillar 3 Were Serious About 
Market Discipline…
9 Strengthen role of boards
– Require attestations from board re:  quality of data and risk 
management systems
9Constrain national safety nets
– Ensure that at least holders of subordinated debt fear loss
– Enhance resolution tools
– Produce a contingency plan to wind down any bank
• Authority to charter a bridge bank
9 Increase the influence of market signals
– Link PCA-like measures to market estimates of insolvency risk
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Supervision Can Achieve More by 
Doing Less
9Emphasize board accountability for outcomes, not 
prescriptive regulations (like Pillar 1)
9 Strengthen incentives for market discipline
– Ensure that shareholders and uninsured creditors 
perceive genuine risk of loss
• Roll back safety nets
• Privatize state-owned banks
• Improve insolvency resolution mechanisms
9Make clear that primary responsibility for safety 
and soundness resides with the board and 
shareholders, not the supervisory authorities
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Enhanced Market Discipline Could…
9 Produce better disclosures than Pillar 3 proposal
9 Improve corporate governance
9Encourage development of more effective risk 
management approaches
9Enhance accountability and performance of 
supervisory authorities
9 Provide a more effective deterrent to regulatory 
capital arbitrage
9Reduce distortions due to Tier 1 & 2 definitions
9 Improve safety and soundness of financial system 
with markedly lower compliance costs
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A New Way Forward?
9Basel II places heavier burdens on supervisors
– IMF/World Bank survey indicated that 42 of the 61 
emerging markets surveyed complied with fewer than 
half the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision
9Why not harness market forces to help achieve 
supervisory objectives?
9 Instead of increasingly prescriptive risk weights, 
require regular issuance of subordinated debt & 
use market signals to
– Allocate supervisory effort
– Trigger prompt corrective action measures
